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Abstract
Mobile health (mHealth) has become important in
the field of healthcare information technology, as pa-
tients begin to use mobile medical sensors to record their
daily activities and vital signs. Since their medical data
is collected by their sensors, the patients may wish to
control data collection and distribution, so as to pro-
tect their data and share it only when the need arises.
It must be possible for patients to grant or deny access
to the data on the storage unit (mobile phones or per-
sonal health records (PHR)). Thus, an efficient frame-
work is required for managing patient consent electroni-
cally, i.e., to allow patients to express their desires about
what data to collect, what to store, and how to share.
We describe several challenges posed by privacy man-
agement in mobile health.
1 Introduction
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) protects personal health information and
provides guidelines for its use and disclosure [1]. The
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clin-
ical Health (HITECH) Act improved upon HIPAA to in-
clude privacy guidelines for the exchange of electronic
protected health information [2]. Medical data is col-
lected when the patient comes to a hospital and this data
is maintained as electronic medical records. Most com-
monly, patients sign a paper consent form that gives the
hospital (and its HIPAA-covered partners) complete ac-
cess to their records.
Doctors can use mobile medical sensors to monitor
their patients while they are out of the hospital; individu-
als may also use such sensors to track their activities and
vital signs for personal wellness improvement. Doctors
might monitor the patient’s health using hospital-owned
sensors, during a hospital visit; in this case, a paper con-
sent form would suffice. But, a patient may wish to use
his own sensor. The patient may monitor data from time
to time and the doctor would need to query the patient,
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once the data collection starts; or the patient may ini-
tiate data collection based on the doctor’s request. In
these scenarios, the patient should be able to respond to
the query and share data, stored on the mobile node or
the PHR, with the doctor. Electronic privacy manage-
ment, however, presents several issues as we describe in
this paper.
2 Challenges
Consider an example scenario. Helen wears a pe-
dometer [4] to record the distance she travels and the
calories burned and this data is periodically sent to her
mobile phone for storage. She visits her wellness coach
frequently and transfers the data from her mobile phone
onto his computer. She wants the coach to analyze her
activities and help her work towards a healthy lifestyle.
She does not, however, want to share her jogging route,
which gets recorded by her mobile phone while it col-
lects pedometer data. In this scenario, Helen wants to be
able to decide what types of health information should
be shared with her wellness coach.
In another scenario, Jack uploads the data on his sen-
sor to his PHR, which is then shared with his doctor.
He is uncertain as to who else will require access to his
health information as part of his treatment. Hence Jack
delegates to his doctor the right to determine the access
policies for all those members of the doctor’s staff who
might require his medical data. In this case, Jack trusts
his doctor. Jack, however, might want to audit his data’s
access logs to make sure that his doctor did not misuse
his trust.
2.1 What data and when to collect
How does the patient determine what data to collect
and when [3]? One solution is to collect data at all times
and then share only the relevant portions with the doctor,
wellness coach or other data consumers. Some patients
might feel uncomfortable collecting data continuously;
as a privacy measure, they may remove the sensors for
some period of time. It is possible, however, that they
might forget to put them back on. If we hope patients
will wear sensors for extended periods, we need to give
them the confidence that they have control over the col-
lection, storage, and sharing of their data.
2.2 Many consumers
Helen and Jack’s stories reveal that patients’ medical
data can be transferred from their sensors to mobile de-
vices or PHRs. The privacy management interface, thus,
has to be set up in either the mobile node or the PHR
system or both. Helen’s wellness coach is the only con-
sumer of her health information. It should be relatively
easy, therefore, for Helen to affirm transfer of data from
her phone, but there still remains the issue of identify-
ing which data (based on sensor type, time of data col-
lection or other facts) has to be shared. In Jack’s case,
however, there are many data consumers and Jack has
no way of knowing who and what roles will need access
to his health records and to what parts of the records.
Finally, assigning access rights to all roles will be both
time-consuming and error-prone. Jack chose to trust his
doctor to grant the proper access privileges to his sub-
ordinates, but it is not clear that all patients might be
willing to do so.
2.3 Data for doctor vs privacy for patient
We have anecdotal evidence that physicians don’t
trust patients to make the right decision concerning what
data is medically relevant; hence they dont want patients
to be given full control over data sharing. They feel that
patients should not hide any data since this might lead
to a wrong diagnosis and might be fatal. On the other
hand, all agree that patients deserve the right to pro-
tect their sensitive information. So should patients be
allowed to control their health information and, if so, to
what degree? The patient can delegate to his doctor the
right to make the choice on his behalf. Another solution
might be that the doctor’s staff could explain the risks
and benefits of each option to the patient, to aid in the
decision-making process. But can these staff truly un-
derstand the patient’s privacy needs? They might also
be oblivious to non-medical risks and benefits.
2.4 Delete or retain data
What should happen to data once it is no longer re-
quired? Should it be deleted (if allowed by the hospital
policy) or retained for further reference [3]? If the pa-
tient deletes her health records, do all copies get deleted
or is a backup retained without her knowledge?
2.5 Query and response formats
A doctor’s query might be temporal (request for all
health records of the past year), based on a procedure
(records related to a recent surgery), or technical (per-
taining to the sensor type). Since there can be many such
queries, doctors and patients would most likely prefer
the query and consent process to be automated. How do
you ask a patient for access to his health record? It is
difficult to come up with a fixed format for the request,
since the nature of queries may vary. While respond-
ing to the query, the patient might have to grant or deny
access for each of the conditions, which will make the
consent process tedious.
2.6 User interface requirements
The interface must allow the patient to revoke or re-
new the privacy settings later, if required. It should al-
low (limited) delegation to the doctor, in case the patient
is unsure of how and with whom to share his health in-
formation. The interface must be usable even by elderly
or disabled patients; some patients might be physically
challenged or have limited technology background [3].
We can expect many patients to simply select the de-
fault options if the interface might be too complicated.
The text on the interface must be unambiguous and ex-
plained clearly, with limited use of medical terms.
3 Proposed Directions
We list a few features that can be included in the
privacy management interface, which could solve some
of the above mentioned issues. Introduction of privacy
icons [5] in healthcare may help address the usability
issue; better comprehension of the privacy risks will in-
crease the patient’s confidence, and thus help him make
the right choice. The interface documentation can list
the different trade-offs and benefits presented by each
option. The interface can recommend an option that
would be beneficial to the patient, based on what the
patient’s peers have selected. The patient could also del-
egate to his doctor, as Jack did above, the right to make
the choice on his behalf.
4 Summary
The patient has certain legal rights to health-data pri-
vacy, to protect his sensitive data and ensure that it
is shared only where needed. Patients will not adopt
mHealth technologies unless they have confidence in
the technology’s support for their privacy. On the other
hand, patients will not trust, or not use, the technology
if the privacy support is too complex to use. Hence it
is important that we come up with a usable and efficient
interface that tackles the above challenges and makes
privacy management effortless.
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